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Abstract 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) created under the World 
Trade Organization in 1995 established minimum standard of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
protection for member nations. Concurrently, the US has used preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) to negotiate for stronger IPR protection in its trading partners.  
This paper empirically accesses the effects of PTAs on US exports. I use a gravity model of trade 
to analyze the changes in US exports to 19 trading partners who signed a PTA with the 
US during the period 1991-2015. I regress US exports on dummy variables that identify the 
signing and entry-into-force of PTAs. I control for a variety of country indicators such as GDP, 
real exchange rate, and trade openness. I also distinguish between high-tech and low-tech 
industries. I create interaction terms with high-tech pharmaceutical exports. I find empirical 
evidence that US exports increase at the aggregate level and for high-tech industries after 
signing the PTA. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Numerous international trade agreements have been created to facilitate global trade 
throughout modern history. The multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
was initially signed in 1947. The preamble of the GATT states it’s purpose is to “reduce tariffs 
and other barriers to trade.” Since 1947, there have been nine rounds of negotiations. During 
the Uruguay round in 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) were created. TRIPS established a minimum 
standard of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for the 123 members of the WTO.1 IPRs 
protection is an important topic for international policy makers because uniform IPRs allow IP 
sensitive industries to trade across borders seamlessly. Additionally, IPRs incentivize innovation. 
 IPRs encourage innovation by issuing temporary monopoly privileges. In addition to 
allowing companies to generate profits free of competition, IPRs enable entities to recuperate 
research and development costs. Society and consumers benefit after IPRs expire because the 
intellectual property (IP) diffuses into the common knowledge pool. Some evidence suggests 
that TRIPS has been successful in connecting IPR systems. Since TRIPs in 1994, global patent 
applications by nonresidents have increased substantially (See Figure 1). This suggests an 
international IPR framework has facilitated greater transfers of knowledge across borders.  
                                                          
1 See World Trade Organization (www.wto.org) for full text and more detailed information. 
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The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is a more recent development 
in the political economy. PTAs are bilateral agreements that reduce barriers to trade. The 
number of PTAs has increased substantially in the last three decades. For example, 25 PTAs 
were reported to WTO in 1990, by 2007 this figure increased to 194 (Foster and Stehrer, 2011). 
Currently, the United States is a member of 20 PTAs, each with intellectual property provisions. 
IPR protection is a mandatory condition of US preferential trade agreement 
negotiations. In most cases, IPR provisions in these agreements expand IPRs beyond the TRIPS 
minimum requirements.  In recent PTAs, it has been ensured that IPR provisions provide 
protections like those found in US law. The most recent PTA was signed with South Korea in 
2007 and entered legal force in 2012. Chapter 18 of the US-Korean Agreement describes 
intellectual property requirements and seeks to establish more “extensive protection and 
Figure 1  Patent applications, nonresidents. Patent applications are worldwide 
patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with 
a national patent office for exclusive rights for an invention--a product or process 
that provides a new way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a 
problem. A patent provides protection for the invention to the owner of the patent 
for a limited period, generally 20 years. 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.NRES) 
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enforcement.” 2The United States has recently negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
which features similar IP provisions. The TPP, negotiated under the Obama Administration, 
creates new trade agreements with many countries. To put this deal in perspective, the TPP 
encompasses “40 percent of the global GDP and nearly one-third of world trade among 800 
million people” (Rogowsky, 2016, pg. 123). The TPP has an important IP component and 
features an entire chapter on IPRs, including new protections for pharmaceutical companies.  
The Trump administration has recently withdrawn from the TPP.  The future of the TPP and 
other American international trade agreements is yet to be seen. 
Raw trade data shows that bilateral trade agreements may affect US trade, and high IP 
goods may be affected differently than low IP goods. Raw export data to Australia is a useful 
example. The US and Australia signed an agreement in 2004. Two types of commodities, 
pharmaceutical products and Electrical Machinery are IP sensitive, while cereals and textiles are 
low IP goods. In general, total trade value seems to increase substantially for each, except for 
cereal exports (Figure 2). The IP provisions in each of these trade agreements create an 
important question. Do US trade agreements increase bilateral exports, especially in IP sensitive 
industries?  Intuition may suggest that PTAs reduce trade barriers between countries causing 
                                                          
2 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov) for full texts of agreements and detailed 
information on agreements. 
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exports to increase. Increased IP protection would suggest that high IP industries, especially 
pharmaceuticals, may increase activity after the agreement is signed.  
If this intuition is correct, to what extent do PTAs affect US exports? No studies have 
focused exclusively on US preferential trade agreements and the responsiveness of US exports 
to these bilateral trade agreements. With the TPP as a distinct possibility in the future, it is 
crucial to understand how trade agreements created by the TPP would impact US trade. Thus, 
this study contributes to a body of literature on the impact of PTAs on trade. The current study 
will also contribute to a body of literature on the international management decisions of high-
tech US firms in response to IPR reform. Results show that total trade value of US commodities 
Figure 2 US exports to Australia for 4 commodities. The preferential trade agreement with Australia was 
signed in 2004. Y axis is annual total trade value in nominal US. Data  from UN Comtrade Database 
(https://comtrade.un.org/). Pharmaceutical and electrical machinery exports proxy for high IP  goods, while 
textile and cereal exports proxy for low IP goods.  
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increased after PTAs were signed. In addition, the study finds that high-tech exports increased 
with statistical significance after the PTA was signed. 
In Chapter 2, I present an overview of the theoretical literature in IPRs and international 
trade agreements. Next, I present empirical papers and findings pertaining to PTAs and US 
responsiveness to IPR reform. I synthesize these papers, create my hypothesis, and identify an 
econometric model that may be useful in identifying trade patterns related to PTAs.  
In chapter 3, I specify my econometric model and explain its components and 
justifications. I provide summary statistics and expected signs for the regression. Next I conduct 
an event study around the signing date of PTAs. Lastly, I provide a summary of how I conducted 
the experiment along with the fixed effects I utilized. 
In chapter 4, I explain my results, interpret coefficients and present rationale for 
significant findings. I also assess the robustness of the models I used. After, I explain the 
findings of my event study of the PTAs. Finally, in Chapter 5, I conclude my analysis by 
explaining the implications of my results in the context of US trade agreements and compare 
my results to the literature. Lastly, I address limitations of my models, and suggest directions 
for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This section provides information on IPR and PTAs in the context of US international 
trade, synthesizes empirical papers on Preferential Trade agreements, and finally presents 
empirical papers on IPR reform and its impact upon the international activities of US 
multinational firms. 
2.1 Background 
Theoretical literature suggests IPRs have an impact on international trade flows. Unlike 
physical property, knowledge is a non-rival good and can be used by many parties without 
reducing the quantity or quality of the good. Without an intellectual property regime to protect 
its use, knowledge is non-excludable. Maskus (2012) argues that we live in a Global Knowledge 
economy in which innovation and ability to commercialize knowledge determines a nation’s 
economic success.  Although monopolies are usually seen as a detriment to economic 
performance, IPR protection offsets the short-term costs of market inefficiencies with future 
competition resulting in superior aggregate outcomes for all involved.3  
 Developed nations have expanded intellectual property rights using international trade 
agreements throughout modern history. The GATT, which later became the WTO, created 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. TRIPS was an important 
international policy development for global intellectual property rights. TRIPS created the most 
comprehensive international IP agreement in history by implementing superior dispute 
resolution. Concurrently, the United States has aimed to expand IPRs further using bilateral 
                                                          
3 See Maskus (2012) for a comprehensive overview of the economic theory of IPRs and information on US 
preferential trade agreements. 
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trade agreements. The United States has made intellectual property a demand in its trade 
negotiation process. The US has been able to expand IPRs beyond the TRIPS in its’ PTAs. This 
has been coined the TRIPS-Plus negotiation strategy. The main components of the TRIPS Plus 
provisions are “greater enforcement, exportation of US laws, upgraded standards abroad, and 
technological protection of digital content” (Maskus,2012, pg. 122). 
The TPP makes extensive IPR requirement for participating nations. Rogowsky (2016) 
explains Intellectual Property rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP is more 
demanding of IPRs enforcement, including more criminal liability for infringement. IPRs in the 
TPP are especially extensive for pharmaceutical companies. Branstetter(2016) discusses the 
additional pharmaceutical IPR created by the TPP.   Intellectual property is an especially 
important topic in the context of the US pharmaceutical industry because additional protection 
provides pharmaceutical developers with the necessary incentives to engage in costly research 
and development. The TPP provides a period of protection called data exclusivity specifically for 
pharmaceutical companies. Data exclusivity prohibits any generic competitor from using the 
drug manufacturers data on the effectiveness and clinical trials of the drug to create similar 
medicines that are not covered under their patents during the protective period. Data 
exclusivity is controversial because it exists simultaneously to the patent and can extend even 
after the patent has expired. The TPP also contains certain additional legal obligations of 
member states regarding the resolution of patent disputes that protect American 
Pharmaceutical companies.  For example, these provisions include mandatory notification of 
the patent holder of any request to market a generic drug that may infringe on a patent.  The 
TPP also provides provisions that allow for patent term extensions in the event of regulatory 
Fay 11 
delays. This is very much like the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act in the United States. Intuitively, the 
extensive IP protections in the TPP should be positive for US high-tech industries. 
2.2 Preferential Trade Agreements 
A substantial amount of literature has addressed the impact of entry into a PTA on 
trade. Goldstein et al.(2007) uses a gravity model to analyze the impact of the multilateral GATT 
and WTO trade agreements. The gravity model is the workhorse equation in bilateral trade 
research. 4 The authors use import data between countries from 1946 to 2007 as their 
dependent ant variable. They find that the GATT WTO may expanded commerce by 
approximately 70 percent between industrial nations, by approximately 45 percent between an 
industrial and a developing nation. Furthermore, empirical results indicate that bilateral 
agreements have a substantial impact on trade. In reciprocal PTA’s they found trade increased 
by between approximately 29 and 34 percent. 
 This paper looks at the magnitude, but not the impact of PTAs on inter industry or intra 
industry trade. Foster and Stehrer (2011) analyze the impact of PTA on the structure of member 
countries trade. Using a Sample 1962- 2000 168 countries the authors use a Gravity model of 
trade to identify the effects of entry into a PTA. The authors use Grubel-Lloyd index of intra 
industry trade as a proxy for trade composition and dummy variables in this equation account 
for the presence of a PTA.  
Their results showed overall intra-industry trade between richer countries increased 
significantly. There was a positive impact of the PTA on intra industry trade among poorer 
                                                          
4 See Methodology for further explanation of the gravity model  
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countries as well, but of a smaller magnitude. This is consistent with the intuition that richer 
countries already have necessary infrastructure, and when the PTA is created industries engage 
in more intra industry trade. 
Previous literature does not account for differences in content across PTAs. Dur et 
al.(2013) addresses the impact of PTAs on trade looking specifically at content and design of the 
agreements.  Some agreements, like the EU, are very broad. On the other hand, some 
agreements are narrower and require fewer commitments. Tariffs have been studied 
extensively by a bulk of literature, but other provisions in PTAs, such as IPR, are likely 
important. To account for depth, the authors create a new data set that codes for agreement 
depth. Provisions that create depth include statements on services trade, investment 
standards, public procurement, competition, IPR. Using a gravity econometric model, the 
authors analyze exports between countries for 536 PTAs signed between 1945 and 2009. 
The empirical findings suggest that PTAs increase exports between two countries, 
especially those agreements with depth. Overall the results stress the significance of design of a 
PTA as an important determinant of trade flow.  One of these factors of depth is the presence 
of IPR in the treaty. These results follow the intuition that strong international institutions make 
international businesses more confident in their ability to market IP sensitive goods abroad.  
This paper did not differentiate between PTAs based on IP provisions. Maskus and 
Ridley (2016) investigate how PTAs with complex IPR impact aggregate exports and aggregate 
imports, relative to a control group. The authors use a treatment-control technique, where the 
treatment group is comprised of countries who will eventually become members of a PTA with 
IP provisions, to measure the impact on aggregate exports and imports, controlling for high-IP 
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goods. The authors classify goods based on IP intensity clustering errors for IP intensity. The 
countries in the data set are then broken into middle and low income groups based on national 
income levels from UN Comrade and World Bank. The authors include a control for each 
nations level of TRIPS compliance to further isolate the impact of IPR on trade. 
The authors find that trade agreements that contain IP provisions have significant 
effects on countries aggregate trade, especially in middle income and developing countries. The 
effects are also seen sectors of high and low income countries as well. These results also seem 
consistent with the intuition a more pronounced IPR regulatory framework creates conditions 
that facilitate international trade. For further investigation Maskus and Ridley(2016) suggest 
that bilateral trade would  provide a better understanding of trade patterns in relation to PTAs 
with IP provisions.  
2.3 IPR Reform & US Companies 
Branstetter et al. (2006) investigate the impact of IPR reform on tech transfer for U.S. 
multinational firms (MNF) in 16 countries. In environments with weak patent protection, MNF 
risk their technology being leaked to other firms, without being able to collect damages. In 
theory, MNF should respond to IP reforms by increasing tech transfers. Two indicators that 
demonstrate increased tech transfer include exporting production abroad and hiring workers in 
these countries. Branstetter et al. (2006) uses data on 2156 firms with 12,961 affiliate 
companies collected in BEA US bureau of economic analysis surveys from 1982 to 1999. IPR 
reform is measured as increased protection in 5 specific areas. These are coverage of protection 
for more types of goods, expansion of scope, increase in length, improvements in enforcement, 
and improvements in administration.  The authors use 16 countries and their timing who 
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underwent extensive IPR reform reforming countries, 15 of which expanded protections in at 
least 4 of the 5 dimensions (Maskus, 2000, Qian,2004, Ginarte and Park, 1997). The dependent 
variables are intrafirm royalty payments, affiliate research and development expenditures, and 
the growth rate of nonresident patent applications. The authors use reform dummies and a 
number of fixed effects and country specific controls. In addition the authors conduct an event 
study on each of the dependent variables, using a series of timing dummies to identify a 
possible anticipation or lagged effect of the reform  
The authors find royalty payments for technology transfers and affiliate research and 
development expenditures increase after IPR reform. Additionally, these increases were 
concentrated mostly among parent and affiliate companies that use patents heavily before 
reform. The findings suggest royalty payments increase by about 34 percent after reform in 
these affiliates. Interestingly the authors do not identify any upward trend before the reforms 
take place. They also concluded that the growth in the rate nonresident patent filing increases, 
while resident patent filing does not.  
Following Branstetter et al. (2006), Canals and Şener (2011) analyze the offshoring 
activities of US industries in the years surrounding IPR reform. In theory, better protection of 
proprietary technology should encourage greater technology transfer among US firms. This 
should manifest itself in more offshoring activities especially those firms who own foreign 
production facilities, hire foreign contractors, and work closely with local suppliers. The impact 
of IPR reform should be especially large in high-tech industries.  
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The data in this paper consists of 23 US industries and 16 trade partners from 1973 to 
2006. The authors construct two measures of offshoring intensity to use in this analysis. Broad 
offshoring intensity is defined as the value of intermediate goods imported by a US industry 
from all industries of the partner country to produce one dollar of product. Intra industry 
offshoring is defined as the import of intermediate goods that a US industry from the same 
industry in the other country to produce one dollar of output. Canals and Şener (2011) use an 
econometric model consisting of country characteristics, a reform dummy, and high tech 
interaction term along with country specific time trends, country-industry, and time fixed 
effects. The authors also use pre-and post-reform dummies and interaction terms in an event 
study to identify possible anticipation or lags in offshoring in response to IPR reform.  
Empirical findings indicate that high tech industries expand offshoring activities in 
response to reform. In broad offshoring, an estimated 27% when compared to low-tech 
industries: In intra-industry offshoring an estimated increase of 82% relative to low-tech 
industries. The authors also find that pre-reform dummies are mostly insignificant, indicating 
that there is not an anticipation effect of the IPR reform. However, the regressions identify an 
effect on high tech industries 2 to 3 years after the reform in broad offshoring, and 3 to 4 years 
after reform in intra industry off shoring. 
2.4 Contribution 
The literature suggests that trade agreements that require increased IP protections 
should result in increased trade, especially among for the US in high-tech industries. Maskus 
and Ridley (2016) looked at PTAs with IP provisions using aggregate trade data. Canals and 
Şener (2011) found that high-tech industries US industries respond positively to IPR reform in 
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other nations. Synthesizing the two findings, this paper investigates how US exports to a nation 
change after signing a PTAs with that nation. First differentiating between high-Tech and 
pharmaceutical commodity exports.  
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Chapter 3: Data Description and Econometric Model 
First, this section describes the data. Next, it explains the gravity model, the binary 
variables, and the specification of the model. Finally, it provides a brief narrative of the 
procedure of the analysis.   
3.1 Data 
 
The data is US bilateral exports to members of PTAs and country characteristics for each 
between 1991 and 2013(See Figure 3).  I use total value of annual US exports, from the UN 
Comtrade Database. The trade data is from 1991 and 2015 because of availability. I collect GDP, 
GDP per capita, trade openness and calculate the real exchange rate using data from the World 
Bank database. The total number of observations is 44648. The natural logarithm are also 
calculated (See Figure 4 & 5). 
US exports are in nominal dollars divided by two-digit industry codes. Following Canals 
and Şener,(2014) commodities are divided into high-tech and low-tech groups (See Figure 6). 
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Figure 3 US preferential trade agreement entry into force gathered from Maskus et al.(2016). IPR depth and signing year 
gathered from Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) Database 
(http://designoftradeagreements.org/www.designoftradeagreements.org/index.html)  
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Figure 4 Descriptive Statistics for all variables. Trade value from (https://comtrade.un.org/data/) Remaining variables at 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). See references for web addresses.  
 
Variable Abv. Observations Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Log of Trade  
value(Nominal $) 
lnTV 44648 15.51 2.95 7.83 24.67 
Log GDP per capita 
(nominal $US 
lnGDPcap 44648 8.61 1.13 5.86 11.12 
Log GDP(Nominal 
$US) 
lnGDP 44648 24.79 1.70 21.12 28.24 
Log Openness  lnOPEN 44459 4.33 .56 3.26 6.09 
Log Real Exchange  lnrealEX 41105 2.02 2.46 -1.62 8.00 
Figure 5  Natural logarithm Descriptive Statistics of all variables Rounded to 2 decimals. Trade value from 
(https://comtrade.un.org/data/) Remaining variables at (http://data.worldbank.org/). See references for web addresses. 
  
Variable Abv. Observations Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Trade  value   
(Nominal $US) 
lnTV 44648 2.36e+08 1.72e+09 2505 5.20e+10 
GDP per capita 
(nominal $US 
lnGDPcap 44648 10350.45 12834.42 351.3978 67652.68 
GDP(Nominal $) lnGDP 44648 2.27e+11 3.85e+11   1.49e+09 1.84e+12 
Openness  lnOPEN 44459 91.58256 72.56565 25.96564   439.6567 
Real Exchange  lnrealEX 41105 176.3988 459.303 .1980858 2966.313 
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3.2 PTA Variables 
 To measure the response of US exports to the PTA, I will introduce two sets of binary 
variables. First, PTA is equal to 1 the year the PTA was signed and each year after. Second, 
PTAinforce is equal to 1 the year the treaty takes legal force and effect and each year after. To 
determine the impact of the preferential trade agreement on high-tech industries, I create 
another binary value. High tech industries equal 1 and all else equaling 0. This variable is 
interacted with PTA and PTAinforce. A separate binary variable is created for pharmaceutical 
commodities equaling 1 for pharmaceutical exports and 0 otherwise. Another interaction term 
is created. 
3.3 Gravity Model 
 A substantial amount of literature uses gravity equations to predict trade flows 
(Goldstein et al. (2007), Foster and Stehrer (2011), Dur et al. (2013) etc.). Newton’s law of 
gravitation explains that the attraction between two masses, is a product of the masses of the 
01-05  Animal & Animal Products (low-
tech) 
06-15  Vegetable Products(low-tech) 16-24  Foodstuffs(low-tech) 
 
25-27  Mineral Products (low-tech) 28-38  Chemicals & Allied Industries 
(high-tech) 
39-40  Plastics / Rubbers (low-tech) 
41-43  Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & 
Furs(low-tech) 
44-49  Wood & Wood Products (low-
tech) 
50-63  Textiles (low-tech) 
64-67  Footwear / Headgear(low-tech) 68-71  Stone / Glass (low-tech) 72-83  Metals(low-tech) 
84-85  Machinery / Electrical (high-
tech) 
86-89  Transportation  (high-tech) 90-97  Miscellaneous(low-tech) 
Figure 6 commodity break down into high-tech and low-tech. following Canals and Şener,(2014)   
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objects divided by the distance between them. Natural logarithms are used to linearize the 
gravity equation. 5 
I use the gravity model as well to explain US exports to each of the 19 trade partners. I 
include four independent variables collected from the World Bank database in my equation. 
Following Canals Şener, (2014) four country characteristics, GDP, GDP per capita, the real 
exchange rate, and trade openness will be used in the model. First GDP and GDP per capita are 
included to “capture the mass associated with each country and its impact on trade flows” 
(Canals and Şener, 2014, pg. 25). For this reason, the expected sign is positive because the 
gravity model implies a larger mass, which creates a greater attraction. Trade openness, which 
is defined as total exports and imports for each country divided by GDP of that country, is a 
measure of a countries involvement in the global economy. This expected sign is also positive 
as. Intuitively, more integration by the nation in the global economy should result in more US 
exports to that country. Finally, the real exchange rate which is defined as foreign currency per 
USD adjusted for CPI, is included. The expected sign of this variable is negative. A higher value 
implies that the dollar has appreciated. An appreciated dollar makes US purchasing power 
greater, and US exports more expensive. (See Figure 8). The logarithm of total trade value of 
exports is regressed on the policy dummies and the natural logarithms of GDP, GDP per capita, 
the real exchange rate, and trade openness are. Following Canals Şener( 2014), I include several 
fixed effects (α): including country fixed effects, time fixed effects, and industry fixed effects, 
and country specific linear time trends while clustering standard errors.  
                                                          
5 See Princeton Encyclopedia of World Economy for more information 
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3.4 Procedure and Expected Results 
 
I perform 20 regressions beginning with the PTA reform dummy, adding the interaction 
term, and then the gravity model independent variables (See Figure 7).I include fixed effects for 
country, year, and commodities. As well as country specific linear time trends. I then perform 
the same regressions with the PTA entry into force variable, adding the interaction term, and 
then the gravity model variables 1 at a time. In these regressions, I also include fixed effects for 
country(c), year(t), and commodities(i). As well as country-specific linear time trends. The 
results for the PTA signing year (Equations 1 and 2) are depicted in Table 1 and Table 2. The 
results for PTA entry into legal force (Equations 3 and 4) are depicted in Table 3 and Table 4. 
See Figure 8 for data description and expected signs. 
 
 
1) Ln(TVct)=αc + αt + αct + αci + β0 + β1 PTA +  β 2PTA*TECHct + β 3 Ln(GDPct , GDPper 
Capitacit Exchangect, Opennessct ) + εct 
2) Ln(TVct)=αc + αt + αct + αci + β0 + β1 PTA +  β 2PTA*Pharmct + β 3 Ln(GDPct , GDPper 
Capitacit Exchangect, Opennessct ) + εct 
3) Ln(TVct)=αc + αt + αct + αci + β0 + β1 PTAinforce +  β 2PTAinforce *TECHct + β 3 Ln(GDPct , 
GDPper Capitacit Exchangect, Opennessct ) + εct 
4) Ln(TVct)=αc + αt + αct + αci + β0 + β1 PTAinforce +  β 2PTAinforce *Pharmct + β 3 Ln(GDPct 
, GDPper Capitacit Exchangect, Opennessct ) + εct 
 
 
Figure 7 Econometric Specification. The panel data is indexed by country(c), year (t), and industry (i).TV is equal to 
total trade value in nominal USD Total value of US exports in nominal USD($) comes from UN Comtrade Database 
(https://comtrade.un.org). TECH is equal 1 for high-tech industries and 0 otherwise. Pharm is equal 1 for 
pharmaceutical commodities and 0 otherwise. LnGDP and LnGDPcap are nominal USD($) come from the World Bank 
Databank (http://databank.worldbank.org). Trade openness is calculated as nominal exports and imports divided by 
GDP available from World Bank Databank. (Real exchange rate comes from World Bank Databank. Real exchanged 
rate is calculated by multiplying Local currency units per USD($) by a ratio CPI of country c divided by US CPI. 
Exchange rate and CPI are also available in the World Bank Databank. 
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3.5 
Event Study of Signing 
This paper conducts an event study surrounding the signing of the PTA to determine if 
empirical evidence shows an upward trend prior to the signing of the PTA. Following Canals and 
Şener (2014) and Branstetter et al. (2006), I regress log of total trade value on a set pre-and 
post-signing year dummies, performing a second regression with a high-tech interaction term. I 
use an interval of three years before and after the signing date.  
The variables are defined as follows. PTApre3 is equal to 1 for each year more than 3 
years before the signing date. PTA_3b equals 1 for data exactly 3 years before the signing year. 
The same is true of PTA_2b and PTA_1b. PTA_1b will be used as a reference point and will be 
omitted due to multi-collinearity. PTAyear is equal to one at the year the PTA was signed. 
PTA_1B is equal to for data exactly 1 year after the reform variable, and the same is the case for 
ADV Expected sign Interpretation  Description 
PTA 
PTAinforce 
+ Binary 1 the year the PTA was 
signed/ commenced 
and after 
PTA_TECH 
PTAinforce_TECH 
+ Interaction with high 
tech industries 
1 the year the PTA 
signed/ took legal force 
and after multiplied by 
the binary variable for 
high tech exports 
PTA_Pharm 
PTAinforc_Pharm 
+ Interaction with 
Pharmaceutical; exports 
1 the year the PTA 
signed/ took legal force 
and after multiplied by 
the binary variable for 
pharmaceutical exports 
GDP + Nominal GDP measures 
the value of all finished 
goods produced in a 
single period . 
Reported in Current 
USD $  
GDPpc + GDP/population of 
county(c)  
Reported in Current 
USD $ 
REXCHANGE _ LCC/$1     *    (CPIc)    
                         CPIus                                
Real exchange rate 
adjusted for prices 
OPEN + (Exports+Imports)ci 
           GDPci 
a measure of 
integration in the global 
economy 
Figure 8 Expected Signs and Descriptions. Trade value from (https://comtrade.un.org/data/) Remaining variables at 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). See references for web addresses. 
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PTA_2a and PTA_3a. PTApost3 equals 1 for each year more than 3 years after the signing year. 
Each dummy is then interacted with high tech industries. The results are depicted in Table 5 
and Table 6. See Figure 9 for graphical representation.  
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Table 1 Total value of US exports in nominal USD($) comes from UN Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org). PTA is equal 
to 1 the year the PTA was signed and each year after. TECH is equal 1 for high-tech industries and 0 otherwise. LnGDP and 
LnGDPcap are nominal USD($) come from the World Bank Databank (http://databank.worldbank.org). Trade openness is 
calculated as nominal exports and imports divided by GDP available from World Bank Databank. (Real exchange rate comes 
from World Bank Databank. Real exchanged rate is calculated by multiplying Local currency units per USD($) by a ratio CPI of 
country c divided by US CPI. Exchange rate and CPI are also available in the World Bank Databank. 
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Table 2: Total value of US exports in nominal USD($) comes from UN Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org). PTA is 
equal to 1 the year the PTA was signed and each year after Pharm is equal 1 for pharmaceutical commodities and 0 otherwise. 
LnGDP and LnGDPcap are nominal USD($) come from the World Bank Databank (http://databank.worldbank.org). Trade 
openness is calculated as nominal exports and imports divided by GDP available from World Bank Databank. (Real exchange 
rate comes from World Bank Databank. Real exchanged rate is calculated by multiplying Local currency units per USD($) by a 
ratio CPI of country c divided by US CPI. Exchange rate and CPI are also available in the World Bank Databank. 
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Table 3: Total value of US exports in nominal USD($) comes from UN Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org). Entry into 
force means the contract is in legal force and effect. PTAinforce is equal to 1 the year the PTA takes legal effect. TECH is equal 1 
for high-tech industries and 0 otherwise. LnGDP and LnGDPcap are nominal USD($) come from the World Bank Databank 
(http://databank.worldbank.org). Trade openness is calculated as nominal exports and imports divided by GDP available from 
World Bank Databank. (Real exchange rate comes from World Bank Databank. Real exchanged rate is calculated by multiplying 
Local currency units per USD($) by a ratio CPI of country c divided by US CPI. Exchange rate and CPI are also available in the 
World Bank Databank. 
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Table 4: Total value of US exports in nominal USD($) comes from UN Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org). Entry into 
force means the contract is in legal force and effect. PTAinforce is equal to 1 the year the PTA took legal force and each year 
after. Pharm is equal 1 for pharmaceutical commodities and 0 otherwise.. LnGDP and LnGDPcap are nominal USD($) come from 
the World Bank Databank (http://databank.worldbank.org). Trade openness is calculated as nominal exports and imports 
divided by GDP available from World Bank Databank. (Real exchange rate comes from World Bank Databank. Real exchanged 
rate is calculated by multiplying Local currency units per USD($) by a ratio CPI of country c divided by US CPI. Exchange rate and 
CPI are also available in the World Bank Databank. 
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Table 5 Dependent variable is log of total trade value in nominal US$. The variables are defined as follows. PTApre3 is equal to 1 
for each year more than 3 years before the signing date. PTA_3b equals 1 for data exactly 3 years before the signing year. The 
same is true of PTA_2b and PTA_1b. PTA_1b will be used as a reference point and will be omitted due to multi-collinearity. 
PTAyear is equal to one at the year the PTA was signed. PTA_1B is equal to for data exactly 1 year after the reform variable, and 
the same is the case for PTA_2a and PTA_3a. PTApost3 equals 1 for each year more than 3 years after the signing year.  
Fay 30 
 
Figure 9  graphical representation of Table 5. Top and bottom lines are 95% 
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Table 6: Dependent variable is log of total trade value in nominal US$. The variables are defined as follows. PTApre3 is equal to 1 
for each year more than 3 years before the signing date. PTA_3b equals 1 for data exactly 3 years before the signing year. The 
same is true of PTA_2b and PTA_1b. PTA_1b will be used as a reference point and will be omitted due to multi-collinearity. 
PTAyear is equal to one at the year the PTA was signed. PTA_1B is equal to for data exactly 1 year after the reform variable, and 
the same is the case for PTA_2a and PTA_3a. PTApost3 equals 1 for each year more than 3 years after the signing year. Each 
dummy is then interacted with high tech industries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of obs = 44648 
F( 17, 18) = . 
Prob > F = . 
R-squared = 0.8228 
Root MSE = 1.244 
(Std. Err. Adjusted 
for 19 clusters in countrycode) 
lnTV  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
PTApre3 -0.0192854 0.1137826 -0.17 0.867 -.2583337 .219763 
PTA_3b -0.0304653 0.0723929 -0.42 0.679 -.1825571 .1216265 
PTA_2b 0.0051161 0.049936 0.1 0.92 -.0997956 .1100277 
PTAyear  0.0082349 0.0269385 0.31 0.763 -.0483607 .0648305 
PTA_1a 0.0728143 0.0524825 1.39 0.182 -.0374474 .183076 
PTA_2a 0.1687106** 0.0682091 2.47 0.024 .0254085 .3120127 
PTA_3a 0.1157133* 0.0662191 1.75 0.098 -.0234078 .2548344 
PTApost3 0.2256829*** 0.0697535 3.24 0.005 .0791362 .3722295 
PTApre3_TECH -0.0763566 0.0754583 -1.01 0.325 -.2348885 .0821754 
PTA_3b_TECH -0.0279671 0.0628077 -0.45 0.661 -.1599212 .103987 
PTA_2b_TECH -0.0137349 0.0623523 -0.22 0.828 -.1447321 .1172624 
PTAyear_TECH 0.0312263 0.037656 0.83 0.418 -.047886 .1103385 
PTA_1a_TECH 0.0616615 0.0577839 1.07 0.3 -.0597379 .183061 
PTA_2a_TECH 0.0300458 0.044592 0.67 0.509 -.0636385 .1237301 
PTA_3a_TECH 0.0875396* 0.0503671 1.74 0.099 -.0182778 .193357 
PTApost3_TECH 0.040279 0.0616801 0.65 0.522 -.089306 .169864 
_cons 28.66668 0.502661 57.03 0 27.61063 29.72274 
      
Year Fixed Effects  
Commodity Fixed effects  
Country-Specific Time Trends 
Clustered Standard Errors for Countries  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Chapter 4: Results 
This Chapter presents the empirical results of the regressions and discusses the 
implications of the findings. It also assesses the robustness of the models. Table 4.1 and 4.2 
report the results for the signing dummies. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the result dummies that 
signal the agreement is in full legal force and affect. The data set in Table 4.1-4.4 are balanced 
data sets for regression 1 through 4. Regressions 5 and 6 in both are some missing some values 
in each of the tables. See Figure 3 for exact discrepancies in observations. Table 4.5 and Table 
4.6 report the results of the PTA event study. These sets are complete, except for Mexico and 
Canada in the pre-dummy set. Graph 3 presents a visual interpretation for of table 4.5. 
4.1 PTA Signing  
In Table 1, the signs of the PTA dummy are positive, indicating the presence of a PTA 
with IP provisions leads to an increase in exports. While these results match the expected signs, 
the PTA coefficient Regression 1 is only significant at the 10 percent level. Regressions 3 
through 5 are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. While the coefficient for Regressions 
2 and 6 is not significant at any accepted level. The interaction term with technology is positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level for all regressions. This indicates that the presence of a 
PTA with IP provisions may lead to an increase in US. In Regression 6, for example the signing of 
a PTA increases exports by high tech industries by approximately 13 percent. 
Overall, the model in Table 1 appears to support the hypothesis that high-tech exports 
increase differently than low-tech exports. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared remain 
consistent throughout the regression table. This suggest the model is robust.  For example, 
regression 1 has an R-squared of .823 meaning the model explains 82.3 percent of the variation 
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in the dependent variable. Model 6, including the high-tech interaction term and four country 
characteristics has an R-Squared of .825 meaning 82.5 percent of the variation is explained by 
this model. A modest .2 percent increase from the baseline equation. 
Signs of the coefficients generally match the expectations in Figure 7 with a few 
exceptions. For example, in Regression 4, 5 and 6 GDP per capita takes a negative sign. 
However, in both Regression 5 and 6 it is not statistically significant. Likewise, real exchange 
rate has a positive sign. Like GDP per capita, real exchange rate is not significant.  
In Table 2 the coefficient on the PTA variable are positive except for regression 2.  
Regressions 1 and 4 are marginally significant, while regression 3 is significant at the 10 percent 
level. Regressions and 5 are both significant at the 1 percent level suggesting that total value of 
bilateral exports increase by approximately 11 percent after the PTA is signed.  The coefficients 
on the pharmaceutical interaction terms are all positive, but none are statistically significant. 
The R-squared for table 2 is also robust throughout. Regression 1 has an R-squared of 
.823 and increases to only .825 adding in all the gravity control variables. Meaning that the 
complete model explains approximately 82.8 percent of the variation in the data.  
4.2 PTA Entry into force 
For the second set of regressions, the results are less promising. In Table 3 the entry into 
force variable is significant in regression 1 and 3 at the 5 percent level. In Regressions 1 and 3, 
the presence of a PTA with IP provisions total value of US exports increase by approximately 10 
percent when the agreement is in full legal force.  The remaining regressions results are only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In this case, interaction with high tech industries 
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in this set yield no significant coefficients. The coefficient of GDP is significant at the 1 percent 
level for regression 6 including all gravity control variables. This coefficient of 1.108 indicates 
that a one standard deviation $3.85e+11 increase in GDP of a country in the sample group 
corresponds to a $4.2658e+11 in total trade value.  
The R-squared in these Regressions is the same as the previous set. Regression 1 has a 
R-squared of .823, increasing to .825 in Regression 6. Like the previous table, this small increase 
suggests the regression is robust.  
The signs of the estimated coefficients generally match the expected, with a few 
exceptions. Once again real exchange rate is positive, but not significant. Additionally, GDP per 
capita becomes negative in Regressions 4 through 6.  
In Table 4, the results are similar. However, the PTA coefficients are all statically 
significant at the 5 percent level. These coefficients suggest that once the agreement takes full 
legal force, bilateral exports increase by approximately 8 to 10 percent. Like Table 2, the 
pharmaceutical interaction term was positive in each regression, but none of the coefficients 
were significant. The gravity controls are also not significant apart from GDP and trade 
openness. The coefficient for log of GDP is 1.109, only slightly larger than the result in Table 3. 
4.3 Event Study 
 The Results of the event study, show no upward trend in anticipation of the signing of 
PTA. However, Table 5 shows a statistically significant trend after the treaty is signed. 1 year 
after the signing, the coefficient is .08 with a p value of .104. The coefficients on the 2 year 
dummy is .17 with a p value of .016. 3 years after coefficient drops to .13 with a p value of .054. 
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The dummy for 4 years and after has a remarkable .23 with a t statistic of 3.7. This indicates 
strong evidence against the null hypothesis, that exports do not increase 4 years after the PTA 
is signed, is false (see Graph 3).  
The results in Table 4 are like the previous regression. The coefficients indicate there is 
not an anticipatory trend prior to signing. The coefficients on PTA show an upwards trend after 
the PTA with IP provisions is signed. 1 year after, the dummy has a coefficient of .05 with a p 
value of .18. Two years after the coefficient increases to approximately .17 with a p value of 
.024.Three years after the coefficient drops to .12 and loses some significance. Four years and 
after, the coefficient jumps to .22 with a p value of .005. Indicating strong evidence that US 
exports increase by approximately 22 percent in this period.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
As the United States negotiates additional trade deals, it is more important to 
understand how international treaties and IPR provisions effect trade flows in different 
industries. The presence of an IPR chapter in each agreement, and the corresponding rise in 
high-tech exports after the treaty is signed suggests there may be some relation between the 
two. IPR has the potential to facilitate a greater flow of ideas across international borders by 
providing innovators with the necessary incentives. IPR protection is equally important in 
maintaining these incentives.  
The primary purpose of this study was to assess the responsiveness of US bilateral 
exports to a country in response to a PTA with that country using a series of fixed effects. 
Overall, the results show the PTA leads to more exports. The extensive IPR mandates in these 
agreements may be viewed as a sort of IPR reform. Similar to the findings in Maskus and Ridley 
(2016), I find that these PTA, which contain IPR depth, correspond to an increase in trade. Like 
Canals and Şener (2014), my results suggest IPR reform affects US high-tech industries in a 
significant way. In addition, like Branstetter et al. (2006) and Canals and Şener (2014), the use 
of a set of pre-and post-dummies shows that there is not an anticipation of the agreement, and 
its IPR provisions. There appears to be an additional kick beginning 2 years after the agreement 
is signed. 
5.1 Further Research 
 Future research may also wish to examine how US bilateral exports are effected looking 
at differing national income levels of trade partners. Further research may also seek to address 
the issue of a control group in this experiment. A control group is not possible with this data set 
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because each preferential trade agreements the US is a member of contains IPR depth. A 
synthetic control group may be useful in this task to isolate the impact of the IPR component in 
US treaties.6  
  
                                                          
6  A synthetic control group is constructed as a weighted average of several countries to form an placebo country. 
Countries used to create the synthetic control would need to have PTAs without and without IPR depth. Countries 
should be selected based on their degree of similarities with the United States and weighted to resemble the 
United States as closely as possible. Country characteristics such as those used in this gravity model may be useful 
when selecting countries. See Borias(2015) “Wage Impact of the Marielitos: a Reappraisal” for information on 
modeling with a synthetic control group.   
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